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Abstract. Trust plays a more and more important role in many fields of computer sciences such
as ambient intelligence, interaction human - machine, affective computing, etc. This paper firstly
constructs a logical framework to represent the qualitative aspect of trust/distrust based on a logic
of belief, a logic of time, and dynamic logic. Secondly, the paper constructs a hedge algebra and
its extension with fuzzy logic to represent the quantitative aspect of trust/distrust and that of their
cognitive factors. Then these two aspects are combined to estimate the degree of trust/distrust based
on the degree of their cognitive factors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Trust plays a more and more important role in many fields of computer sciences such as ambient
intelligence, interaction human - machine, affective computing, etc. In this paper, an approach is in-
troduced to combine the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of trust/distrust. At the qualitative
cognitive level, some emotions based on the cognitive definition of trust [3] and distrust [4] are repre-
sented in a formal logic based on the logic of beliefs and choices as the one of Herzig and Longin [12]
(a refinement from Cohen and Levesque [7]), the logic of time (introduced by Arthur Prior [18]), and
dynamic logic introduced by Fischer and Ladner [8] and Harel et al. [11]. This part is closed to the
work of Goudou et al. [10, 16], Bonnefon et al. [1, 2], and Nguyen [17]. At the quantitative level,
the qualitative aspects of trust/distrust are represented by introducing a hedge algebra to represent
several different (and fuzzy) degrees of trust/distrust as well as that of their cognitive factors. This
hedge algebra is based on the hedge algebra of Nguyen and Wechler [5, 15], and its extension with
fuzzy logic (Nguyen et al. [13, 14]).
As being discussed in our previous works [1,2,17], one of the main limitations of the logic proposed
in these works is that they can only present the concept of trust/distrust in two bipolar values (yes
or no). The main objective of this paper is to extend these logics by combining them with a hedge
algebra and its extension with a fuzzy logic to present several degrees of trust/distrust.
This paper is organized as follows: Session 2 introduces the logical framework to represent
trust/distrust based on their cognitive factors. Session 3 introduces the hedge algebra to represent
many degree of trust/distrust and that of their cognitive factors. Session 4 combines the cognitive
and qualitative aspects of trust/distrust. The final session is a conclusion and future works.
c© 2015 Vietnam Academy of Science & Technology
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2. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, a logical framework is introduced to cognitively represent the concept of trust. This
logic is mainly based on the logic Bonnefon et al. [1,2] and Nguyen [17], the logic of beliefs and choices
as the one of Herzig and Longin [12] (a refinement from Cohen and Levesque [7]), the logic of time
(introduced by Arthur Prior [18]), and dynamic logic introduced by Fischer and Ladner [8] and Harel
et al. [11].
2.1. Syntax
The syntactic primitives of our logic are as follows: a nonempty finite set of agents AGT =
{i1, i2, . . . , in}, a nonempty finite set of atomic events EVT = {e1, e2, . . . , ep}, and a nonempty set
of atomic propositions ATM = {p1, p2, . . .}. The variables i, j, k. . . denote agents. The expression
i1:e1 ∈ AGT × EVT denotes an event e1 intentionally caused by agent i1 and e1 is thus called an
“ action ”. The variables α, β. . . denote such actions. The language of our logic is defined by the
following BNF :
ϕ :=p | i:α-do | ¬ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | Xϕ | X−1ϕ | Gϕ | Beliϕ | Choiceiϕ | GrdIϕ
where p ranges over ATM , i:α ranges over AGT × EVT , i:α-do ranges over ATM for each
i:α ∈ AGT×EVT , and I ⊆ AGT . The classical boolean connectives ∧ (conjunction),→ (material
implication), ↔ (material equivalence), > (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction) are defined from ¬
(negation) and ∨ (disjunction).
• i:α-do reads “ agent i is just about to perform the action α ”;
• Xϕ reads “ ϕ will be true next instant ”;
• X−1ϕ reads “ ϕ was true at the previous instant ”;
• Gϕ reads “ henceforth, ϕ is true ”;
• Beliϕ reads “ agent i believes that ϕ is true ”;
• Choiceiϕ reads “ agent i prefers that ϕ be true ”;
• GrdIϕ reads “ ϕ is publicly grounded between the agents in group I ”.
Abbreviations are defined as follows:
i:α-done
def
= X−1i:α-do
Happensi:αϕ
def
= i:α-do∧Xϕ
Afteri:αϕ
def
= i:α-do → Xϕ
Donei:αϕ
def
= i:α-done∧X−1ϕ
Fϕ
def
= ¬G¬ϕ
Goaliϕ
def
= ChoiceiFBeliϕ
Intendiα
def
= ChoiceiFi:α-do
Ableiα
def
= ¬Afteri:α⊥
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Capacityi(α,ϕ)
def
= Afterj:αϕ ∧ Ablejα
Possibleiϕ
def
= ¬Beli¬ϕ
Awarenessiϕ
def
= X−1¬Beliϕ∧Beliϕ
• i:α-done reads “ agent i has done action α ”;
• Happensi:αϕ reads “ agent i is doing action α and ϕ will be true next instant ”;
• Afteri:αϕ reads “ ϕ is true after any execution of α by i ”;
• Donei:αϕ reads “ agent i has done action α and ϕ was true at previous instant ”;
• Fϕ reads “ ϕ will be true in some future instants ”;
• Goaliϕ reads “ agent i has the goal (chosen preference) that ϕ be true ”;
• Intendiα reads “ agent i intends to do α ”;
• Ableiα reads “ agent i is capable to do α ”;
• Capacityi(α,ϕ) reads “ agent i is capable to do α to bring ϕ ”;
• Possibleiϕ reads “ agent i believes that it is possible ϕ ”;
• Awarenessiϕ reads “ agent i has just experienced that ϕ is true ”.
2.2. Semantics
For temporal operators, we use a semantics based on linear time described by a sequence (or story) of
time points. (This semantics is very close to CTL* [6]) A frame F is a 4-tuples {H,B,C,G} where:
• H is a set of stories that are represented as sequences of time points, where each time point is
identified by an integer z ∈ Z, a time point z in a story h is called a situation < h, z >;
• B is the set of all B[i] such that B[i](h, z) denotes the set of stories believed as being possible
by the agent i in the situation < h, z >;
• C is the set of all C[i] such that C[i](h, z) denotes the set of stories chosen by the agent i in
the situation < h, z >;
• G is the set of all G[I] such that G[I](h, z) denotes the set of stories which are publicly
grounded in the group I of agents, in the situation < h, z >.
All the accessibility relations B[i] are serial. All the accessibility relations G[I] are serial, transi-
tive and Euclidean (This is similar to the operator group grounding introduced by Gaudou et al. [9]).
All the accessibility C[i] are serial. Moreover, we impose for every z ∈ Z that: if h′ ∈ B[i](h, z)
then C[i](h, z) = C[i](h′, z). It means that if an agent believes that the world h’ is possible from
the world h, then the set of his/her preference worlds from h and h’ are the same. In other terms, the
worlds an agent prefers and the ones that agent believes that s/he prefers are the same (briefly, the
agent is conscious about his/her preferences, and s/he prefers what s/he believes that s/he prefers).
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A model M is a couple {F,V} where F is a frame and V is a function associating each atomic
proposition p with the set V(p) of couple (h, z) where p is true. Truth conditions are defined as
follows:
M, h, z |= p iff (h, z) ∈ V(p)
M, h, z |= Xϕ iff M, h, z + 1 |= ϕ
M, h, z |= X−1ϕ iff M, h, z − 1 |= ϕ
M, h, z |= Gϕ iff M, h, z′ |= ϕ for every z′ ≥ z
M, h, z |= Beliϕ iff M, h′, z |= ϕ for every (h′, z) ∈ B[i](h, z)
M, h, z |= Choiceiϕ iff M, h′, z |= ϕ for every (h′, z) ∈ C[i](h, z)
M, h, z |= GrdIϕ iff M, h′, z |= ϕ for every (h′, z) ∈ G[I](h, z)
Other truth conditions are defined as usual.
2.3. Axiomatics
Due to our linear time semantics, the temporal operators satisfy the following principles:
i:α-do ↔Xi:α-done
Xϕ↔¬X¬ϕ
ϕ↔XX−1ϕ
ϕ↔X−1Xϕ
Gϕ↔ϕ∧XGϕ
G(ϕ→ Xϕ)→(ϕ→ Gϕ)
Beli and Choicei operators are defined in a normal modal logic plus (D) axioms. Thus, if 2
represents a Beli operator or Choicei operator:
ϕ
2ϕ
(RN2)
2(ϕ→ ψ)→(2ϕ→ 2ψ) (K2)
2ϕ→¬2¬ϕ (D2)
For example, axiom D2 applied to operator Beli isDBeli , which is described as: Beliϕ→ ¬Beli¬ϕ.
(RN2) means that all theorems are believed (respectively: chosen) by every agent i; (K2) means
that beliefs (respectively: choices) are closed under material implication for every agent i; (D2) means
that beliefs (respectively: choices) of every agent i are rational: they cannot be contradictory.
The Beli operators satisfy the following principles of introspection:
Beliϕ↔BeliBeliϕ
¬Beliϕ↔Beli¬Beliϕ
that means that agent i is conscious of its beliefs and of its disbeliefs.
The following principle follows from the semantical constraint between belief accessibility relation
and choice accessibility relation, and from axiom (D2) for Beli:
Choiceiϕ↔BeliChoiceiϕ
¬Choiceiϕ↔Beli¬Choiceiϕ
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that means that agent i is conscious of its choices and of its dischoices.
The sound and complete axiomatization of GrdI operator is defined as the one of common belief
operator (also called mutual belief), which is closed to the operator described in Walton and Krabbe
[19], also introduced by Gaudou et al. [9]:
ϕ
GrdIϕ
(RNGrdI )
GrdI(ϕ→ ψ)→(GrdIϕ→ GrdIψ) (KGrdI )
GrdIϕ→¬GrdI¬ϕ (DGrdI )
GrdIϕ→GrdIGrdIϕ (4GrdI )
¬GrdIϕ→GrdI¬GrdIϕ (5GrdI )
Axiom (RNGrdI ) means that every tautology is public ground. Axiom (KGrdI ) means that if ϕ
is publicly grounded in I and that ϕ implies ψ then ψ is also publicly grounded in I . Axiom (DGrdI )
means that the set of grounded informations is consistent: it can not be the case that both ϕ and ¬ϕ
are simultaneously grounded. The positive introspection axiom (4GrdI ) and negative introspection
axiom (5GrdI ) account for the public character of GrdI . From these collective awareness results: if ϕ
has (resp. has not) been grounded then it is established that ϕ has (resp. has not) been grounded.
Linear time semantics entail the following principles:
Gϕ→Afteri:αϕ (Gϕ)
Happensi:αϕ→Afterj:βϕ (Happensϕ)
Afteri:αϕ↔¬Happensi:α¬ϕ (Afterϕ)
Axiom (Gϕ) describe the relationship between time and action: if henceforth ϕ is true then after
every action α of every agent i, ϕ will be true. (Note that the converse is not valid: it is possible
that ϕ be true after every action α of every agent i performed in a situation < h, z >, and that ϕ
be false at time z′ > z.)
As time is linear, actions are deterministic on a given history. Thus, axiom (Happensϕ) reads: if
agent i is just about to perform α after what ϕ will be true, then after every performance of every
action β by every agent j, ϕ will be true. In other words, if action α leads to a time point where ϕ
is true, then every action performed by every agent leads to this time point.
Finally, axiom (Afterϕ) means that Afteri:α and Happensi:α operators are dual operators. This
property is fair with respect to dynamic logic [11].
3. HEDGE ALGEBRA
In this section, a hedge algebra is introduced to represent the degree of trust. This hedge algebra
is based on the hedge algebra theory of Nguyen and Wechler [5, 15] and its extension with fuzzy
logic [13,14].
This hedge algebra is a set AX = {X,G,H,6}, where:
• X : the basic set of AX X = {0 (not at all), very low, low, little low, average, little high,
high, very high, 1 (absolute)}
• G: the set of generators G = {little,moreorless(neutral element),much}
• H : the set of linguistic hedges (also called unary operators, or hedge operations) h = {very}
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• 6: is an ordered relation between any two elements of X : 0 6 very little 6 little 6 more
or less 6 much 6 very much 6 1
This algebra provides a set of hedges which could be associated with any cognitive factor of
trust/distrust. For instance, with the concept of trust, we could have many variations:
• Agent i does not trust agent j at all
• Agent i trusts very little j
• Agent i trusts little j
• Agent i trusts more or less j
• Agent i trusts much j
• Agent i trusts very much j
• Agent i trusts absolutely j
These variations have different degrees. The degree of each depends on the fuzziness measure [14] of
the linguistic associated with it. In this algebra, the fuzziness of each element is defined as indicated
in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The fuzziness of linguistic hedges associated with trust/distrust and their cognitive
factors
In this model, it defines how the degree of a variation of trust/distrust (or its cognitive factors)
is identical to the fuzziness measure of the linguistic hedge associated with it
d(< hedge >< object >) =fm(< hedge >) (1)
where < hedge >∈ AX is any linguistic hedge in our hedge algebra. < object > could be
trust/distrust or a cognitive factor of them. fm(x) is the fuzziness measure of the linguistic hedge
x.
For instance, the degree of trust much is the same as the fuzziness measure of the hedge much
(d(trust much) = fm(much)), or the degree of trust very much is the same as the fuzziness
measure of the hedge very much (d(trust very much) = fm(very much)).
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4. COMBINATION OF COGNITIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS
OF TRUST
In this section, the formalization of trust and distrust is presented basing on the cognitive definition
of Castelfranchi and colleagues [3, 4].
4.1. Trust
The concept of trust is formalized basing on Castelfranchi and Falcone’s definition [3] of trust in
action which says that agent i trusts agent j to ensure ϕ by performing action α if and only if (i)
agent i desires to achieve ϕ, and agent i expects that: (ii) agent j is able to perform action α to
achieve ϕ; and (iii) agent j has the intention to do action α.
However, these three factors are only necessary conditions, but not sufficient ones. So here it is
needed to add another condition for trust: an agreement between trustor and trustee that the trustee
will perform such an action (GrdItrustee : α-do), where I = {trustor, trustee}. Accordingly the
concept of trust is formalized as:
Trusti,j(α,ϕ) =Goaliϕ ∧ BeliCapacityj(α,ϕ)
BeliIntendjα ∧ BeliGrd{i,j}j:α-do
The effects of each cognitive factor on trust are under consideration:
• The first factor, Goaliϕ, has many possible values corresponding to different degree of agent
i’s preference for ϕ: the more agent i prefers for ϕ, the more agent i trusts j in doing α to
achieve ϕ, and vice versa.
• The second factor, Capacityj(α,ϕ), has many possible values corresponding to different
degree of agent i’s belief in the ability of j to do α to achieve ϕ: the more agent i believes that
j can do α to achieve ϕ, the more agent i trusts j in doing α to achieve ϕ, and vice versa.
• The third factor, Intendjα, also has many possible values corresponding to different degree
of agent i’s belief in the intention of j to do α: the more agent i believes that j intents to do
α, the more agent i trusts j in doing α to achieve ϕ, and vice versa.
• The last factor, Grd{i,j}j:α-do, has only two possible values of true or false (or yes/no, 1/0 ).
Let d(x) ∈ [0, 1], x could be trust, distrust, or one of their cognitive factor, be the degree of x.
So the degree of trust is estimated as:
d(Trusti,j(α,ϕ)) = ftaf (d(Goaliϕ), d(BeliCapacityj(α,ϕ)), (2)
d(BeliIntendjα), d(BeliGrd{i,j}j:α-do))
where ftaf is a trust-aggregation-function (TAF) mapping: ftaf : [0, 1]
4 → [0, 1] which satisfies
the following conditions:
(1).ftaf (a, b, c, 0) = 0
(2).0 ≤ ftaf (a, b, c, 1) ≤ 1
(3).ftaf (a1, b, c, 1) ≤ ftaf (a2, b, c, 1) if a1 ≤ a2
(4).ftaf (a, b1, c, 1) ≤ ftaf (a, b2, c, 1) if b1 ≤ b2
(5).ftaf (a, b, c1, 1) ≤ ftaf (a, b, c2, 1) if c1 ≤ c2
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Table 1: Some variations of trust and distrust degree based on their contribution factors
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not at all not at all not at all yes not at all more or less
not at all absolute not at all yes little not at all
not at all absolute absolute yes much not at all
... ... ... ... ... ...
very little very little very little yes very little more or less
very little very much very little yes little little
very little very much very much yes more or less little
... ... ... ... ... ...
little little little yes little more or less
little much little yes more or less more or less
little much much yes more or less little
... ... ... ... ... ...
more or less more or less more or less yes more or less more or less
more or less very little very little yes little much
more or less very much very little yes more or less little
more or less very much very much yes much little
... ... ... ... ... ...
much much much yes much more or less
much much little yes more or less more or less
much little little yes more or less much
... ... ... ... ... ...
very much very much very much yes very much more or less
very much very little very little yes little very much
very much very much very little yes much more or less
... ... ... ... ... ...
absolute not at all not at all yes little absolute
absolute very much very little yes much much
absolute much little yes much much
absolute absolute absolute yes absolute little
For instance, when using ftaf (a, b, c, d) = d ∗ a+ b+ c
3
, some degree of trust depends on that
its cognitive factors are indicated in Table 1. For example, Federer is a professional tennis player, his
coach at the U.S. Open Champions is Stefen. Let’s consider the trust of Stefen on Federer before the
final match of the U.S. Open Champions with the action is α = “win the final match”, and the
desired status is ϕ = “the champion of the U.S. Open 2015”:
• Stefen desires absolutely that Federer becomes the champion of U.S. Open 2015:
d(GoalStefenϕ) = absolute.
• There is a common ground between Stefen and Federer that Federer will play the final match:
d(BelStefenGrd{Stefen,Federer}Federer:α-do) = yes.
• Stefen believes absolutely that Federer also intends to win the final match:
d(BelStefenIntendFedererα) = absolutely.
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• But Stefen believes that the ability to win the final match for Federer is 50-50 :
d(BelStefenCapacityFederer(α,ϕ)) = more or less.
• So, Stefen trusts very much Federer to win the final match to becomes the U.S. Open cham-
pion:
d(TrustStefen,Federer(α,ϕ)) = very much.
4.2. Distrust
The definition of distrust given by Castelfranchi et al. [4] also adopted. This definition says that
agent i distrusts agent j to ensure ϕ by performing action α if and only if (i) agent i desires to
achieve ϕ, and agent i believes that at least one of these conditions is fulfilled: (ii) agent j is not in
the capacity to do action α, or (iii) agent j is not able to do α to achieve ϕ. Accordingly this concept
is formalized as:
DisTrusti,j(α,ϕ) = Goaliϕ ∧ (Beli¬Capacityj(α,ϕ) ∨ Beli¬Intendjα))
The effects of each cognitive factor on distrust are under consideration:
• The first factor, Goaliϕ, is the same in the concept of trust: It has many possible values
corresponding to different degree of agent i’s preference for ϕ: the more agent i prefers for ϕ,
the more agent i distrusts j in doing α to achieve ϕ, and vice versa.
• The second factor, ¬Capacityj(α,ϕ), has many possible values corresponding to different
degree of agent i’s belief in the ability of j to do α to achieve ϕ: the more agent i believes that
j can not do α to achieve ϕ, the more agent i distrusts j in doing α to achieve ϕ, and vice
versa.
• The third factor, ¬Intendjα, also has many possible values corresponding to different degree
of agent i’s belief in the intention of j to do α: the more agent i believes that j does not intent
to do α, the more agent i distrusts j in doing α to achieve ϕ, and vice versa.
So the degree of distrust is estimated as:
d(DisTrusti,j(α,ϕ)) =fdaf (d(Goaliϕ), d(¬Capacityj(α,ϕ)), d(¬Intendjα)) (3)
=fdaf (d(Goaliϕ), 1− d(Capacityj(α,ϕ)), 1− d(Intendjα))
where fdaf is a distrust-aggregation-function (DAF) mapping: fdaf : [0, 1]
3 → [0, 1] which
satisfies the following conditions:
(1).0 ≤ fdaf (a, b, c) ≤ 1
(2).fdaf (a1, b, c) ≤ fdaf (a2, b, c) if a1 ≤ a2
(3).fdaf (a, b1, c) ≤ fdaf (a, b2, c) if b1 ≤ b2
(4).fdaf (a, b, c1) ≤ fdaf (a, b, c2) if c1 ≤ c2
(5).fdaf (a, b1, c1) ≤ fdaf (a, b2, c2) if min(b1, c1) ≤ min(b2, c2)
For instance, when using fdaf (a, b, c) =
a+min(b, c)
2
, some degree of distrust depends on that its
cognitive factors are indicated in Table 1. For example, let’s consider a situation in which, a boss asks
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his new secretary to prepare an important report for the meeting today (α = “prepare the report”,
and ϕ = “having the good report”):
• A boss desires absolutely that he has the report for the meeting:
d(Goalbossϕ) = absolute.
• In spite the boss believes that the new secretary intends to write the report, he believes more
or less that the she is not able to write such the important report:
d(¬Capacitysecrectary(α,ϕ)) = more or less.
• So, the boss distrusts very much his new secretary in writing the report to have a good report:
d(DisTrustboss,secretary(α,ϕ)) = very much.
The results extracted in the Table 1 also indicate that it is not the case that d(Trusti,j(α,ϕ)) =
1− d(DisTrusti,j(α,ϕ)). In other words, These results indicate that trust and distrust are not a
polar pair of concepts. This is consistent with the argumentation of Castelfranchi et al. [3, 4].
5. CONCLUSION
This paper firstly introduces a logical framework for the representation of the cognitive concept of
trust/distrust based on a logic of belief, a logic of time, and a dynamic logic. Secondly, it introduces
a hedge algebra and its extension with fuzzy logic to represent the degree (qualitative aspect) of
trust/distrust and that of their cognitive factors. These two aspects of trust/distrust are then com-
bined to estimate the degree of emotions based on the degree of their cognitive factors. The paper
estimates seven different degrees (not at all, very little, little, more or less, much, very much,
absolute) of the two concepts (trust, distrust) based on the degree of their cognitive factors.
For future research, the representation, in both cognitive and qualitative aspects, of some emotions
and the relation between emotions and trust/distrust is some perspectives in future works.
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